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I. INTRODUCTION

Enforcement of environmental laws is one of the key issues in the
debate over the relationship between trade and environment in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). t Without uniformly strong
enforcement in all three NAFTA nations, there is the potential for increased migration of "dirty" industries to nations with lax enforcement,
and for increased environmental degradation. Furthermore, industries
subject to lax enforcement do not have to internalize environmental compliance costs and so have a competitive advantage over their international
rivals. This article discusses various approaches to encouraging enhanced
enforcement of environmental laws as one component of a supplemental
agreement to the NAFTA. The article focuses on the enforcement approach advocated by the Center for International Environmental Law and
the Defenders of Wildlife. First, this article sets forth the enforcement
proposals put forward by the governments of the three Parties, by the U.S.
Congress, and by the environmental community. The article then analyzes
the two basic approaches to enforcement found in these proposals, concluding with suggestions for the most effective ways to incorporate environmental enforcement provisions in NAFTA side agreements.
Throughout the debate over NAFTA, much attention has been focused
on the relative quality or stringency of the environmental laws of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico. In part because Mexico is still a
developing nation joining a common market with two developed nations,
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States (1992)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
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and in part because of the appalling environmental conditions present in
the U.S.-Mexico border region, much of this attention has focused on the
quality of Mexico's environmental laws.2
In an effort to ameliorate environmental fears over NAFTA, the United
States government undertook a survey of Mexico's environmental laws that
concluded that by and large, Mexico's laws were on a par with those of its
proposed NAFTA partners.3 Rather than eliminating environmental fears,
however, the study's conclusion served to refocus environmentalists' concerns. Many within the environmental community questioned how the
environmental situation in the border region could be so deplorable if
Mexico maintained a credible system of environmental laws. Naturally,
attention was directed at the pattern of enforcement of environmental
laws within Mexico. Early indications provided substantial evidence that
although Mexico had a developed system of environmental laws, enforcement of these laws was almost nonexistent. 4
Driven at least in part by fears that its poor record of environmental
enforcement could jeopardize the negotiation and approval of a NAFTA,
Mexico undertook substantial efforts to develop enhanced enforcement
capabilities and to begin the process of actual environmental law enforcement. For example, Mexico closed, at least temporarily, approximately 200
factories for environmental violations at a critical juncture in the NAFTA
process.5
2. This is not to suggest that the environmental enforcement records of the United States and
Canada are stellar. In fact, as environmentalists have sought to avoid the appearances of ecoimperialism by also examining the enforcement records of the United States and Canada, these
records have shown themselves to be woefully below what would be expected from developed
nations.
3. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMEN-

TAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 5-6, GAO/NSIAD-91-227 (May 1991) [hereinafter GAO,
ENVTL. REG. & ENFORCEMENT]; William K. Reilly, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Administrator, EPA, Free Trade and the Environment: Tools for Progress, Remarks at a Meeting
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2 (Mar. 23, 1992) ("Mexico has a set of laws that are fully
equivalent to what we have in the United States"). But see Tod Robberson, Cloud Over Trade Pact
- Texas Too, WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Cloud Over Trade] (discussing
transboundary air pollution from a power plant on the Mexican side of the border, and noting that
the plant meets Mexican standards that are significantly lower than U.S. standards).
4. See GAO, ENVTL. REG. & ENFORCEMENT, supra note 3.
5. About 20 Percent of PlantsClosed for Pollution ProblemsAllowed to Reopen, 14 int'l Env't Rep.
282, 282 (1991). Betty Ferber de Arijidis, spokesperson for the Group of 100, Mexico's main
environmental group, has noted the temporal linkage between heightened Mexican enforcement
activities and the U.S. Congress' consideration of Fast Track negotiating authority for NAFTA.
See Jan Gilbreath Rich, FTA Prompts Overhaul at Ecology Secretariat, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 26, 1991, at 13 (quoting Betty Ferber de Arijidis), quoted in ROBERT PASTOR,
INTEGRATION WITH MEXICO: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 60 (1993). While the 200 plus plant closure
figure appears on its face substantial, semantic differences in the term "plant closure" may
undercut this figure. For example, a "plant closure" in Mexico can include the closure of a plant
for a period of hours while a plant gets its papers in order, or a closure of a valve within a
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Despite Mexico's efforts to step up environmental law enforcement,
serious concerns remain regarding the ability of all three NAFTA Parties to
fully enforce their environmental laws. 6 These concerns manifest themselves on at least two levels: 1) concerns for the physical health and well
being of the NAFTA Parties' citizens and the North American environment; and 2) the competitive abilities of the NAFTA Parties to compete
economically on a level playing field.
Economic development in the U.S.-Mexico border region has occurred
largely without enforcement of environmental law by either the United
States or Mexico, and the region provides a vivid warning as to the
environmental consequences of uncontrolled industrial growth. Simply
put, virtually every medium (water, land and air) in the border region has
been in someway significantly degraded by unfettered growth. The region's
surface waters are veritable sewers, thick with human feces and industrial
toxins.7 The subsurface water tables, upon which the arid region is highly
dependent for both human and industrial consumption needs, are similarly
compromised. 8 Toxic hot spots, areas where industrial and often hazardous and/or toxic wastes have been disposed of without regard for law or
the environment, dot the region's landscape. 9 Hazardous wastes are routinely burned by landfill operators, releasing dangerous levels of toxic
compounds into the region's air.1" The human costs of these environmen-

production facility. See Michael Gregory, Environment, Sustainable Development, Public Participation and the NAFTA: A Retrospective, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 99, 164 (1992); Tod Robberson,
Mexico's Environmental Dilemma, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993, at A36 (discussing violations of
environmental laws by thousands of small businesses in Mexico).
6. See, e.g., HILARY FRENCH, WORLDWATCH PAPER No. 113, COSTLY TRADEOFFS: RECONCILING

TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 32 (Mar. 1993) (citing estimate by Mexican enforcement official
that only 35% of all U.S. owned maquiladoras comply with Mexican toxic waste laws).
7. See, e.g., Robert Tomsho, EnvironmentalPosse Fights Lonely War Along Rio Grande, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 1992, at Al; Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, EnvironmentalConsiderations of the
Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 262 (1992);
Robert Suro, Border Boom's Dirty Residue Imperils U.S.-Mexico Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991,
at Al; Paul Salopek, Soup of Toxins Simmers in Rio Grande, EL PASO TIMES, May 15, 1991, at 1A,
4A (noting that the laundry list of harmful industrial contaminants found in the Rio Grande
includes chromium, selenium, lead, manganese, barium, zinc, arsenic, nickel, nitrates, sulfates,
DDT, and chlordane).
8. Feeley & Knier, supra note 7, at 259 n.70.
9. See generally Elizabeth C. Rose, TransboundaryHarm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems
and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAW. 223, 229 (1989); Dr. Lilia Albert, Hazardous Industrial
Wastes in Mexico, Remarks to the Forum on Mexican Environmental and Health Issues: Options
for North American Solutions, cited in Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental
Elements of the NAFTA Package, Testimony Before the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, United States Senate 4 (Mar. 16, 1993) (on file with NRDC) [hereinafter NRDC Testimony].
10. Rose, supra note 9, at 236; Dr. Lilia Albert, Hazardous Industrial Wastes in Mexico,
Remarks to the Forum on Mexican Environmental and Health Issues: Options for North American Solutions, cited in NRDC Testimony, supra note 9, at 2.
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tal tragedies are only now beginning to be recognized."1
To a lesser degree, the United States-Canada border shares many of
these same environmental ill effects caused by North American economic
activity in the absence of sufficient environmental protections. A recent
study conducted by the Sierra Club found that the Great Lakes were a
"toxic soup" of more than 500 chemicals. 2 In 1990, U.S. companies alone
dumped more than 680 million pounds of toxic chemicals into the Great
Lakes.13 In addition to the environmental costs, environmental degradation of the Great Lakes is estimated to threaten 2.9 million14 jobs, valued at
more than $76 billion on the U.S. side of the border alone.
Beyond the physical consequences of environmental degradation attendant to lax environmental enforcement, a great deal of attention has
recently been focused on the competitiveness aspects of lax environmental
enforcement. In the context of NAFTA, those concerned with "pollution
havens" believe that lax enforcement, most often in Mexico, allows companies to externalize environmental costs that they would otherwise be
forced to internalize through environmental compliance costs. As industries seek to cut their costs of production, allowing companies to externalize environmental costs is believed to encourage industrial flight to countries
with lax enforcement.' 5 Despite intense debate over the validity of the
pollution haven theory, the experience within the wood finishing industrial
sector has demonstrated that industrial
migration can indeed be motivated
16
costs.
regulatory
by environmental
11. See, e.g., Gaynell Terrel, Tragic Puzzle Grips Families on the Border, HOUSTON POST, May 17,

1992, at Al, A19 (discussing links between chemicals, including xylene and toluene, used by
industrial plants in Matamoros, Mexico, and incidence of anencephalitis (babies born with
incomplete or no brains) in Brownsville, Texas); Paul Salopek, Crowded Border Imports High Rate
of Disease, EL PASO TIMES, May 14, 1991, at 1A (noting population around the Nogales sister cities

is infected with hepatitis at a rate 20 times the U.S. national average).
12. Kelly McParland, Lakes Cleanup Put at US$76B, FINAN. POST, June 24, 1993, at 8 (quoting

Brett Husley, director of Sierra Club's Great Lakes Program).
13. Lois Sweet, Toxic Lake Water Called "Frightening," TORONTO STAR, June 14, 1993, at C3.

14. McParland, supra note 12, at 8.
15. See, e.g., Senator Max Baucus, NAFTA Needs Environmental Side Agreements, 10 ENVTL. F.

30, 30 (1993).
16. See GAO, U.S.-MExico TRADE: SOME U.S. WOOD FURNITURE FIRMS RELOCATED FROM Los
ANGELES TO MExico, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,

COMM. ON ENERGY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-

1-4, GAO/NSIAD-91-191 (Apr. 1991). Roughly forty Southern California furniture makers
relocated to Mexico to avoid the Southern California Air Quality District's stringent air emissions
standards. Id. See also Duane Chapman, Environmental Costs and NAFTA, Testimony Before the
U.S. International Trade Commission (Nov. 18, 1992) ("Environmental and worker protection
may indeed be significant factors in industrial location"); FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, RELEASE,

TIVES

STANDARDS DOWN, PROFITS UP! (Jan. 1993). But see UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE'S

1992)
(arguing that Mexico will not become a pollution haven because: 1) Mexico's environmental laws
are comparable to those of the United States; 2) enforcement is improving in Mexico; and 3) the
cost of complying with existing U.S. environmental law is too small to induce companies to move to
OFFICE, MYTHS & REALITIES: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (Oct.
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Moreover, examining solely the issue of industrial flight may be viewing
the true nature of environmental regulatory effects on competitiveness too
narrowly. While the cost of environmental regulatory compliance alone
may not be high enough to prompt widespread industrial flight, once a
company has made the decision to relocate, the failure to comply with
environmental laws can be used to gain higher profit margins and, therein,
increase competitiveness. One study by the environmental group Friends
of the Earth has found that companies can increase profit margins by more
than two hundred percent by not meeting environmental laws. 17 Companies that can, without the specter of enforcement, increase their profit
margins by over two hundred percent obviously enjoy a competitive advantage over their competitors who pay to comply with environmental laws.
In addition to concerns about competitive advantages, serious political
concerns exist over NAFTA-driven pollution haven job loss. In fact, the
mere perception that NAFTA allows an industry to gain a competitive
advantage through lax environmental enforcement could significantly harm
18
the chances of Congressional approval of NAFTA.
II.

APPROACHES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHES

Given this backdrop, it was not unexpected that in his October 1992
campaign speech on NAFTA, then-Governor Bill Clinton emphasized that
a NAFTA supplemental agreement must, inter alia, provide a mechanism
to ensure that each NAFTA Party enforces its own environmental laws.1 9
Mexico to avoid these costs); Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 89, 89-104 (Patrick Low ed., 1992) (arguing that
pollution migration does not occur).
17. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 16.

18. See Jane Bussey, Trade Pact Doomed if It Ignores Labor, Environment, Critics Warn, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 4, 1993.
19. Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at the Student Center at North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, North Carolina, at 13-14, Federal News Service, Oct. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Executive File. Clinton remarked:
I think the new Congress should pass legislation to provide for public participation in
crafting our position and ongoing disputes, and to give citizens the right to challenge
objectionable practices by the Mexicans or Canadians....
Before implementing the agreement, we must establish an environmental protection
commission with substantial powers and resources [that will] encourage the enforcement
of each country's own environmental laws through education, training and commitment of
resources, and provide a forum to hear complaints.
Such a commission would have the power to provide remedies, including money
damages and the legal power to stop pollution. As a last resort, a country could even be
allowed to withdraw.
If we don't have the power to enforce the laws that are on the books, what good is the
agreement?
We must have some assurances on this. This is a major economic as well as environmental issue.
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After his inauguration, President Clinton's commitment to ensuring environmental enforcement became one of the most heated areas of debate
concerning the supplemental environmental negotiations.
Early in his tenure, United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
sought to set the terms of the debate around the goal of encouraging
national enforcement of national laws. As a means of developing a framework for this approach, Ambassador Kantor pointed to NAFTA's provisions on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) as a model for
encouraging enforcement of national environmental laws.2 ° This approach
was finally adopted by the U.S. when it tabled its negotiating text in late
May 1993 in Ottawa. However, the U.S. negotiating text also included a
provision that would use trade sanctions in certain circumstances.2 1
In order to "promote effective enforcement of the environmental laws of
each Party,"22 the U.S. supplemental environmental proposal creates two
complementary, and not mutually exclusive, legal mechanisms. As to national enforcement, Article 6 states that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that
persons with a legally cognizable interest in the particular matter have
appropriate access to administrative or judicial procedures for the enforcement of the Party's environmental laws." 23 Theoretically, therefore, a
harmed U.S. citizen, as well as Mexican and Canadian citizens, could use
the Mexican court system to remedy an environmental violation in Mexico.
The U.S. proposal would also provide "fairness and transparency" by, inter
alia, requiring the proceedings and decisions to be public, ensuring certain
evidentiary safeguards, and mandating certain cost and time limits.2 4
Second, Article 16 of the U.S. proposal would allow either a Party or the

20. See, e.g., Testimony of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative,
Before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, at 5-6 (Mar. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Kantor Testimony]. Ambassador Kantor's
written testimony provides:
In thinking about ways to improve [environmental] enforcement, it is noteworthy that all
NAFTA parties committed in Articles 1714-16 of the NAFTA, to a significant set of
principles and administrative and judicial procedures for the domestic enforcement of
intellectual property rights. We will review these provisions to assess their applicability
for environmental and labor issues. Procedures like these to promote due process,
judicial review, and citizen access to judicial and administrative bodies can contribute to
improved enforcement of the law, as well as increased public confidence in the law.
Id.
21. See U.S. Negotiating Text, Inside U.S. Trade (May 21, 1993) [hereinafter U.S. Negotiating
Text]. The U.S., Mexican and Canadian proposals were leaked to this publication. See also
Mexican Negotiating Text, Inside U.S. Trade (May 21, 1993) [hereinafter Mexican Negotiating
Text]; Canadian Negotiating Text, Inside U.S. Trade (May 24, 1993) [hereinafter Canadian
Negotiating Text].
22. U.S. Negotiating Text, supra note 21, art. 1(e).
23. Id. art. 6(1).
24. Id. art. 6.
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Secretariat of the proposed North American Commission on the Environment (NACE) 25 to convene a special session of the NACE Council to
address "a persistent and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement" of any
Party's environmental laws.26 The Secretariat would possess the authority
to obtain any enforcement or compliance information from a Party, subject
to that Party's law, and "[i]f a Party does not make available any such
information ... it shall promptly furnish a written statement of its reasons
to the Secretariat., 2 7 After the Secretariat prepared an enforcement report, if two of the three Parties so agreed, the Council could convene an
arbitral panel under NACE to consider the matter.2 8 Unlike dispute
settlement under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA itself, the NACE panel's
proceeding would be open to the public. 29 If the panel made an affirmative
finding of nonenforcement, then the Council would have 30 days "to
resolve the matter," after which the complaining Party could "suspend an
appropriate level of benefits under the NAFTA" in order to encourage
enforcement.3 °
Throughout the discussions of the NAFTA supplemental environmental
agreement, including the enforcement component, Mexico's approach has
been largely reactive, watching developments within the United States and
reacting to proposals. From the outset of the supplemental process, however, Mexico has repeatedly stated that any NAFTA supplemental agreement must observe three general rules: 1) no reopening of the NAFTA
25. The role of the proposed NACE is outlined in Articles 8 and 10:
1. The Parties hereby establish the Commission on the Environment, whose mandate
shall be to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.
2. The Commission shall be composed of:
(a)
their
(b)
(c)

a Council, comprising [cabinet-level environmental ministers] of the Parties or
designees;
a Secretariat; and
a Public Advisory Committee.

Id. art. 8. The U.S. proposal would allow the NACE to
consider any matter in respect of the environment, including:
(a) living natural resources, including threatened and endangered species;
(b) the conservation of other renewable natural resources;
(c) environmental matters as they relate to economic development, including the
environmental effects of the NAFTA;
(d) process and production methods;
(e) general goals for enforcement programs; and
(f) pollution prevention techniques and strategies.
Id. art. 10.
26. Id. art. 16.
27. Id. art. 12.
28. Id. art. 16.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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text; 2) no creation of supranational institutions with powers over national
governments; and 3) absolute respect for each NAFTA nation's sovereignty. 3 ' Mexico's concern over the interplay of sovereignty and NAFTArelated enforcement issues is not without reason. One need only look at
32
case to understand Mexico's sensitivity in the
the recent Alvarez-Machain
33
enforcement.
of
area
Accordingly, the Mexican negotiating proposal differed substantially
from that of the U.S. with regard to an approach to enforcement. Mexico's
proposal does not provide for the use of trade sanctions of any type.
Rather, its censure mechanism would make public, "unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties," any NACE Executive Committee (NACE Council)
'recommendations" for remedying failures to enforce environmental laws,
along with the response of the culpable Party.34 These recommendations
would be made by the NACE only if two Parties allege "unjustifiable,
persistent and systematic failure to enforce domestic environmental law in
order to attract or retain investment, occurring after the entry into force of
this Agreement., 35 The Mexican proposal would allow a Party to justify its
nonenforcement for a number of reasons.3 6 Mexico advocates a role for
only within the context of proposed National Advisory
public entities
37
Councils.
The Mexican proposal additionally includes a section on national enforcement of environmental laws. "Each Party shall ensure that any person with
legal standing under its environmental law has recourse to procedures for
the enforcement of environmental 39laws." 3 8 The proposal also calls for
expediency and procedural fairness.
The Canadian proposal for a supplemental environmental agreement
also does not contemplate the use of trade sanctions, but it does set forth
31. See, e.g., Jane Bussey, Official Tells What Mexico Won't Accept, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 3, 1993
(quoting Mexico's Deputy Foreign Minister Andres Rozental).
32. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992) (upheld Bush
Administration's forcible abduction of a Mexican citizen from Mexican territory for purposes of a
criminal trial in the United States).
33. See Bussey, supra note 31 (quoting Mexican Senator Portifiro Munoz Ledo jokingly stating
that Mexico will not accept the creation of an "ecological [Drug Enforcement Administration]");
see also David C. Scott, US Court Ruling Provokes Heated Mexican Retort, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 17, 1992, at 1; Ambler H. Moss, Jr., A Democratic Party Approach to Latin America, 34 J.
INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1, 3-4 (1992) (discussing the effects of Alvarez-Machain on Latin

America's view of the United States); Daniel Williams, U.S. & Mexico Plan Talks on Extradition,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at A15 (discussing efforts to negotiate a legally binding solution to
abductions by the U.S.).
34. Mexican Negotiating Text, supra note 21, art. 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 6.
38. Id. art. 8.
39. Id.
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detailed provisions for national enforcement of environmental laws. According to the Canadian proposal, if consultation between two Parties fails to
resolve differences over "a consistent pattern of violations of the
obligations" of the agreement, then two Parties may call for the establishment of an "Enquiry Committee." 4 The Committee would consist of at
least two environmental experts, and would investigate the matter and
publicly report findings and recommendations, "including suggested stages
and time tables for the implementation of its recommendations."'" To
establish "a consistent pattern of violations" would require "a pattern of
reliably documented violations." 4
The Canadian proposal also promotes national enforcement by requiring the Parties to provide their citizens access to judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative procedures necessary to promote implementation and enforcement of domestic environmental laws.4 3 These procedures include the
right to request an investigation, the right to sue, the right to seek court
injunctions, the right to initiate private prosecutions, and the right to seek
44
correction of administrative actions.
Two additional provisions of the Canadian proposal are noteworthy.
First, as to transboundary pollution, the proposal provides that within five
years of the entry into force of the agreement, the Parties shall work
toward ensuring that a person in the jurisdiction of another Party will have
"the same rights and remedies" for addressing transboundary pollution
effects as a citizen of the Party itself.45 Second, the Canadians seek a
provision which would allow "the territorial units [of a Party] in which
different environmental laws are applicable" to opt out of the environmental agreement.4 6 Canadian provinces wary of the powers of the national
government are the likely impetus for this clause.
III. CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT PROPOSALS

Unwilling to sit idly by, a number of influential members of the United
States Congress also have set benchmarks for environmental enforcement.
These proposals were intended to assist the Clinton Administration in
developing its own enforcement approach so that the Administration
proposal would receive political support in Congress and from the environmental community.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Canadian Negotiating Text, supra note 21, art. 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 13.
Id.
Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 22.
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ENFORCEMENT PROPOSAL OF SENATOR BAUCUS

Senator Max Baucus, a third-term Democrat from Montana and Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and of the
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee,
set forth his version of enforcement of environmental laws in the NAFTA
context in a speech on January 29, 1993. 4" The structure of an enforcement
mechanism would include a North American Commission on Environment
(NACE) with both consulting and investigative powers.48 The consulting
arm would include technical experts capable of advising government and
business on compliance with regulations, available environmental technology and necessary financing, while also working with enforcement officials
to prove environmental violations. The other main function of the NACE
would be to evaluate and investigate environmental complaints.4 9
In a subsequent floor speech, Senator Baucus suggested that environmental complaints targeting firms not in compliance with the domestic environmental laws be filed with the NACE. 50 A NACE panel of experts will
screen the complaint based on whether the firm is engaging in trade under
NAFTA and whether the complaint itself has merit. Thereafter, a validated complaint will be investigated by the NACE using procedures like
the EPA's. If searches or subpoenas are necessary, the NACE will act
through the national environmental enforcement body.5 1 If NACE identifies "a pattern of non-compliance or non-enforcement," NACE notifies
the domestic trade enforcement body of its findings and that entity is to act
on the findings using its normal procedures. At the same time, the NACE
consulting arm is to work with the offender to identify compliance measures. 5 ' After a four month "grace period," the investigative arm of NACE
is to conduct an inquiry to determine whether progress towards compliance has been achieved. 53 The results of this investigation are reported to
the national government, which may impose a penalty if there has been
insufficient movement towards correcting the environmental problem.
Possible penalties mentioned by Senator Baucus include "snapback" or

47. Senator Baucus was the major Senate environmental voice during the NAFTA negotiations.
48. Senator Max Baucus, Remarks to the American Bar Association National Institute on the
North American Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with authors).
49. Id.; see also Memorandum from American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, to
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Constitutional Questions Involving Proposed North American Commission on the Environment (Apr. 15, 1993) (on file with authors)
(analyzing favorably the constitutional issues with respect to NACE's on-site investigatory and
subpoena powers).
50. CONG. REC. S2980 (daily ed. March 17, 1993).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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"punitive" tariffs,5" or denial of a company's right to export to its NAFTA
neighbor.55 If penalties are approved by the national government, a NAFTA
dispute panel may rule on their "fairness" and also determine whether the
enforcement procedure set forth in the side agreement was followed. The
complaint process is designed to take no more than twelve
entire NACE
6
5

months.

B.

ENFORCEMENT PROPOSAL OF CONGRESSMEN WYDEN AND
RICHARDSON

Congressmen Ron Wyden and Bill Richardson, Democrats from Oregon
and New Mexico respectively, introduced their vision of a NACE and of
NAFTA environmental enforcement in March 1993. Their NACE would
establish a process to improve enforcement of environmental laws, standards and regulations that are not subject to NAFTA dispute settlement
but that affect one of the following three areas: trade or investment
57
patterns, global commons, or transboundary environmental conditions.
The Congressmen call for an enforcement process that includes public
hearings, consultations between the parties and the NACE, and annual
reports on the status of enforcement measures. Thereafter, consultations
regarding enforcement shortcomings identified by the NACE would take
place between the parties with an eye to "resolv[ing] outstanding issues in
a timely fashion." 5 8 If the issues are not resolved in a timely fashion, the
parties may request that the NACE consider sanctions authorizing the
requesting party to levy a charge of not more than one percent ad valorem
on all imports from the offending country. The funds collected from such a
charge would be dedicated to an environmental protection fund administered by the NACE which would be used to fund improved enforcement
and environmental remediation. Additionally, the size of the import charge
should be linked to the amount of funds needed to adequately finance
enforcement programs.5 9
C.

ENFORCEMENT PROPOSAL OF CONGRESSMAN GEORGE BROWN

Congressman George Brown, a Democrat from California, introduced
54. Snapback tariffs are provisions in trade agreements or legislation which allow a nation to
withdraw previously made tariff concessions under specific circumstances. Thus, the tariffs "snap
back" to a previous, higher level.
Punitive tariffs do not necessarily bear any relation to previous tariff levels; they can be set at a
level which effectively denies market access.
55. CONG. REC. S2980 (daily ed. March 17, 1993).
56. Id.
57. See H.R. Con. Res. 63, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id.

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:593

two pieces of comprehensive legislation on March 24, 1993, linking NAFTA
and future Western Hemisphere trade agreements with threshold labor,
environmental and agricultural standards, and implementing enforcement
of these standards.6" In the North American context, Congressman Brown
and his co-sponsors call for the establishment of a trinational commission,
which has the authority to investigate, adjudicate, and issue binding judgments in a timely manner.
The areas of environmental quality that would be within the enforcement jurisdiction of the commission include: a) protection of environmental quality and ecosystems; b) disclosure of information on toxic chemical
and hazardous substance discharges; c) prevention of export of toxic and
hazardous substances that are banned in the country of origin; d) prevention of the export of products produced in an environmentally unsound
manner that undermine counterpart standards in the importing country;
and e) requirements that industry decrease its pollution discharges and
upgrade control technology.6 1
Petitions alleging violations of the environmental standards and requesting action by the commission would be filed by any signatory nation or
informed person within a signatory nation. After public proceedings and a
public determination, the trinational commission could authorize an aggrieved NAFTA party to: a) suspend, withdraw or prevent NAFTA benefits; b) impose proportionate duties or offsetting fees or restrictions; or c)
enter into binding agreements that eliminate the environmentally harmful
practice, eliminate burdens or restrictions on NAFTA trade, provide compensatory trade benefits or provide financial arrangements to remedy the
damage.6 2
IV. ENFORCEMENT PROPOSALS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY
Each of the Congressional proposals was an important part of the
NAFTA debate on trade and environment, and the environmental community was pleased to assist in the formulation of these ideas. Nonetheless,
environmentalists, hoping to advance the Clinton Administration's agenda
beyond the solely national enforcement model, were contributing their
own plans for effective enforcement mechanisms early on.
While U.S. legislators and the NAFTA countries toiled to develop
official positions on a supplemental agreement concerning inter alia enforcement, the U.S. environmental community aggressively sought not only to
respond to the Clinton Administration's advances, but also to define a

60. See H.R. 1445, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1446, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
61. See H.R. 1445, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
62. Id.
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range of proposals that the NAFTA parties could use in crafting a mechanism to encourage enforcement of environmental laws.63 This approach
was made possible, in great measure, by the "constructive engagement/
wait and see" posture most of the environmental community adopted
towards NAFTA under President Clinton. 64
Given the profusion of delicate and complex issues at play (e.g. national
sovereignty), the debate within the environmental community was at times
heated as efforts were made by many groups to develop a consensus
enforcement approach to present to the Administration. While the environmental community has not yet been able to speak with a single voice, the
community, in its dealings with both the executive branch and the Congress, has been able to develop two general, and not mutually exclusive,
approaches to enforcement of environmental laws attendant to NAFTA.
The first of these approaches is built upon Ambassador Kantor's idea of
using the IPR sections of NAFTA as a model for encouraging national
enforcement of national laws. 65 Both the Natural Resources Defense
Council and the Environmental Defense Fund have aggressively pushed
for this option as a means of encouraging enforcement.6 6
The second approach to enforcement sought to use the newly proposed
North American Commission on the Environment (NACE) to authorize a
party to use trade sanctions where the NACE found that the failure of
environmental enforcement was causing an injury to another party. This
approach was advanced by a coalition of twenty-five groups in a letter to
Ambassador Kantor, 67 and was most vigorously advocated by the Center
for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and the Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders). While certain groups have argued more stridently on
behalf of one of these two approaches, the environmental community in
general has recognized that neither of these approaches to enforcement is
a replacement for the other; in order to fully address the environmental
enforcement concerns attendant to NAFTA, both domestic citizen suit
provisions and trade measures are necessary. Since the use of citizen suits

63. See, e.g., Letter from Defenders of Wildlife, Center for International Environmental Law, et
al., to United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, at 9-12 (Mar. 4, 1993) (authored jointly
by 22 environmental and consumer groups or coalitions) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Letter
of March 4, 19931; STEWART J. HUDSON & RODRIGO PRUDENCIO, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION,

THE NORTH AMERICAN

COMMISSION

ON THE ENVIRONMENT

AND OTHER

SUPPLEMENTAL

NAFTA PACKAGE (Feb. 4, 1993).
64. The leeway given to President Clinton in the NAFTA process may have been a product of
his political affiliation with the Democratic Party. See Seth Cagin & Philip Dray, Are the Greens
Turning Yellow?, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A23 (discussing environmentalists' deferential
approach). The sagacity of this deference remains to be seen.
65. See Kantor Testimony, supra note 20.
66. See NRDC Testimony, supra note 9, at 4 (testimony of Justin Ward and Jacob Scherr).
67. Letter of March 4, 1993, supra note 63.
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was being pursued by the administration in conjunction with USTR Kantor's IPR model, groups like CIEL and Defenders have devoted more
attention to the use of trade measures. It must also be noted that the
environmental community has, by and large, recognized that in order to
play an effective enforcement oversight role, the NACE must also have the
powers and resources to conduct independent monitoring and investigative
activities.6 8
The common themes present in the enforcement proposals of the Congressional leaders and the environmental community reflect far more than
mere coincidence. In fact, environmentalists worked closely with Congressional leaders, both in assisting these members to develop their proposals,
and in crafting the proposals coming from the environmental community.
Assuming that any sort of effective supplemental enforcement provisions
ultimately result, the coordinated efforts of the environmental community
and Congressional leadership will have been instrumental in guiding the
Clinton Administration in this endeavor.
V. OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT PROPOSALS

The enforcement proposals set forth by the Parties, by U.S. legislators,
and by environmentalists have all relied heavily on either the use of citizen
suit provisions as in IPR enforcement, or on use of trade sanctions, or
some combination of the two. These two models for enforcement would
each bring different strengths and weaknesses to the NAFTA.
A.

THE IPR APPROACH

NAFTA's chapter 17 provides that "[e]ach Party shall provide in its
territory to the nationals of another Party adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that
measures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade." 6 9 Given the NAFTA Parties' commitment in
chapter 17 to enforcement of an obligation only indirectly related to
traditional free trade precepts, combined with a commitment that the
enforcement of these obligations shall not hinder "legitimate" free trade,
it should be no surprise that the IPR provisions of NAFTA have been
looked at by many influential individuals and groups, including United
States Trade Representative Kantor, as a model for NAFTA-related environmental enforcement.7 °
68. See, e.g., id.
69. NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 1701.1.
70. See Kantor Testimony, supra note 20; see also G. Foy, Environmental Protection Versus
Intellectual Property: The U.S. Mexico Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, 4 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 323,
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Chapter 17 sets out extensive substantive and procedural protections
that each NAFTA country is required to provide holders of intellectual
property rights. Perhaps the most important commitment to IPR enforcement occurs in Article 1715, which requires the parties to provide nationals of the other NAFTA parties access to, and fair procedures in, civil
judicial and administrative proceedings to enforce their rights. 7 The essence of these provisions is that IPR holders have the right to take their
72
cases to the domestic administrative and judicial tribunals of each Party,
and these tribunals have an obligation to provide them with a fair hearing. 73 If a tribunal finds that their IPR rights have been violated, the
tribunal has the authority and obligation to provide the IPR holder with
substantial forms of relief as set out in the chapter. 74 By way of analogy,
the IPR sections of the NAFTA provide right holders with essentially what
75
are under United States environmental laws citizen suit provisions, coupled with the traditional civil procedure and constitutionally mandated
due process rights that attach in cases before U.S. courts.76
In envisioning how an IPR model for enforcement could be applied in
the area of environmental enforcement, two different schemes have been
developed. The fundamental difference between these two schemes lies in
whether the right to sue to force domestic enforcement of environmental
laws would be extended in all cases to non-nationals. Under one approach,
each NAFTA country would provide citizens from all other NAFTA
323-337 (1992).
71. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1715.1-1715.17. Article 1716 also requires the parties to provide
judicial authorities with the power to order "provisional measures" to protect the interests of IPR
holders. Id. art. 1716. Article 1717 also commits the parties to providing criminal enforcement of
IPR at least in cases of "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale." Id. art. 1717.1.
72. Id. art. 1715.1.
73. See, e.g., id. art. 1715.1(d) (right to present evidence); 1715.1(b) (right to independent
counsel); 1715.2(a) (right of access to information in the possession of the other party).
74. See, e.g., id. art. 1715.2(d) (judicial authority to order infringer to pay right holder damages);
1715.2(e) (judicial authority to order infringer to pay right holder's expenses including attorney
fees); 1715.2 (judicial authority to order infringer to desist from further infringement).
75. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Federal Water Pollution Control Act citizen suit provision); 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (Clean Air Act citizen suit provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act citizen suit provisions). Because the IPR sections of
NAFTA allow for cross-border suits by non-nationals they are more closely related to the citizen
suit provisions under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 6972. The Solid Waste
Disposal Act provides that any "person" can commence a citizen suit. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(a). The
Solid Waste Disposal Act has been held not to apply extraterritorially, see Amlon Metals v. FMC
Corporation, 775 F. Supp. 668, 672-676 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Nonetheless, a foreign plaintiff complaining of an injury from a violation of the statute that occurred within the territorial boundaries of the
United States, and who fulfilled all other standing requirements, would presumably be able to
invoke the protections of the statute.
76. See, e.g., Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901) (notice and opportunity to be heard in civil
cases).
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countries, as well as their own citizens, access to judicial and administrative procedures to compel enforcement of environmental law. Under the
second approach, each NAFTA party would be required to provide only its
own nationals with "citizen standing" to commence actions to compel
enforcement.
1. The Cross-Border Citizen Suit Scheme
The cross-border citizen suit scheme would have each NAFTA country
agree in a supplemental environmental agreement to allow both its nationals and non-nationals from NAFTA countries the right to bring environmental citizen suits. This model is similar to the model adopted under the
Nordic Environment Convention.77 Similarly, in the North American context, transboundary environmental standing already exists in a number of
instances at the state-provincial level. Under agreements between U.S.
states and Canadian provinces, environmental reciprocal access to justice
statutes have already been enacted in a number of jurisdictions.7 8 These
statutory provisions remain largely, if not wholly, unused.79 Additionally,
the Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United States
provides an example of cross-border equal access
provisions in the area of
80
protection of the North American environment.
The attraction of a cross-border citizen suit agreement is substantial.
Citizen suits have been one of the most important factors in advancing
environmental protection in the United States.8 ' Properly conceived and
implemented, citizen suit provisions that allow the citizens of all NAFTA
nations to serve as environmental watchdogs over the actions of their
governments and corporations doing business within their borders would
be an important step towards the full enforcement of environmental laws.
77. See Nordic Environmental Protection Treaty, Feb. 19, 1974, 1092 U.N.T.S. 279; see also Joel
A. Galob, The Birth of the North American Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff: Transboundary
Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and Remedy, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85
(1991).
78. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.076 (1991) (defining reciprocating jurisdiction); § 468.078
(reciprocal access for pollution originating in Oregon); § 468.079 (reciprocal access for pollution
originating in reciprocating jurisdiction); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:58A-1-8 (1992) (Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Law).
79. A recent survey of state attorney generals' offices failed to identify a single case brought
under the statutory provisions implementing these equal access to justice agreements. In fact, the
survey found that, in many states that had such statutory provisions, the attorney general's office
was oblivious to their existence. Eric Gould, Center for International Environmental Law, Survey
of Equal Access to Justice Amendments (Apr.-June 1993) (unpublished, on file with authors).
80. See Boundary Waters Treaty, art. II, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-United Kingdom, 36 Stat.
2448, T.S. No. 548. The United Kingdom signed the treaty on behalf of Canada.
81. See W. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENT 72 (1973); William H. Timbers &
David Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 403 (1985).
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Moreover, by providing citizens of Mexico with new avenues for democratic participation, this scheme might play a significant role in enhancing
participatory democracy in Mexico.8"
2. The Domestic Citizen Suit Scheme
An alternative approach to citizen suit based environmental enforcement would be to require each country to provide its own citizens with
standing to challenge the acts of their government. Each country would, of
course, remain free to accord similar rights to non-nationals; however, the
provision of such rights would not be mandatory. Because this approach
limits the right of oversight to each country's nationals, it may be perceived
as less sovereignty-intrusive and less imperialistic than a cross-border
approach to citizen suits.8 3
National enforcement is part of the approach favored by the U.S. and
Canada in their relatively detailed supplemental environmental agreement
proposals. 84 Mexico's negotiating text provides only a very general framework for national enforcement. 85 The full effect of these proposals cannot
be judged until an agreement is reached and is then implemented.
3. Standing Issues
Both the cross-border and domestic citizen suit schemes raise issues
with regard to the rights of citizens to bring environmental enforcement
cases. Both of these approaches would require from the outset significant
changes to the laws of each country. For example, Mexican law does not
provide citizens with standing, or the right to independently commence
legal actions to compel the government to enforce its environmental
laws. 86 Both the cross-border and domestic schemes would require Mexico
to completely alter its legal system. Because the cross-border scheme
would also require Mexico to provide NAFTA-nationals with access to its
courts, the changes required to adopt this approach would cut deeper than
those required by a wholly domestic citizen suit scheme. Similarly, several

82. For a critical discussion of Mexican democracy, see Asa Cristina Laurell, Mexico, A Restricted Democracy, 5 CUADERNOS CASA DEL SOL 1 (1992).
83. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 22-24, 43-44 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
86. See RAUL BRANES, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, INCLUDING THE PARTICIPATION OF NONGOVERNMEN-

91-92 (1991); Tom Louderback, Oracle on
the Border 17 (unpublished manuscript, on file with CIEL). Mexico's law does allow citizens to
" BRANES, supra. This right,
bring "complaints before a political-administrative authority ..
however, should be distinguished from the ability to commence a citizen suit or action. Id.
TAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
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United States statutes, such as "Swampbuster" 87 and "Sodbuster," 8 8 that
may rightfully be perceived as environmental statutes do not provide for
citizen standing. These statutes would have to be amended to provide for
such standing provisions.
In addition to the general standing issues raised by both the crossborder and domestic citizen suit schemes, the cross-border scheme also
raises several unique standing issues. For example, many U.S. statutes that
provide for citizen standing only provide such standing to "citizens" of the
United States. These citizenship standing requirements would prevent a
non-national from having standing to raise a claim under these statutes.
Here again the standing provisions of this second category of statutes
would have to be amended to broaden their standing provisions to provide
standing to any "person."
Additionally, because under U.S. law a plaintiff can only claim standing
based upon an injury to a protected interest, 89 absent changes to every
environmental statute to define a level playing field for international trade
as a protected interest, a Canadian or Mexican citizen could not potentially claim standing on the basis that they are competitively disadvantaged
by the United States' failure to enforce its environmental laws. Thus, while
the cross-border citizen suit scheme may be the best method of addressing
physical environmental harms from NAFTA, the failure of current environmental laws to protect as justiciable the interests of foreign competitors is
not properly addressed by this scheme. Moreover, absent the redefinition
of injury to include competitive disadvantage, a Mexican or Canadian
trying to meet existing standing requirements will also have tremendous
difficulty in trying to show that they have suffered a particularized injury
that is different from the injury suffered by all other members of North
American society from the complained of act. 90
Even if the U.S. Congress were to revisit every environmental statute to
ensure that NAFTA nationals had the statutory right to bring cases,
standing difficulties would remain. In 1992, Justice Scalia, writing for a
fractured United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 91
narrowed the scope of standing that citizens enjoy to challenge govern87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-23 (producing an agricultural commodity on converted wetlands, or
converting wetlands for such use, results in ineligibility for some government benefits, including
certain loans, subsidies, and disaster relief).
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-13 (producing an agricultural commodity on highly erodible land or on
land designated for conservation results in ineligibility for some government benefits, including
certain loans, subsidies and disaster relief).
89. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
90. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
91. 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
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ment actions. In a discussion of a cross-border scheme, this decision poses
at least two difficulties. First, the Court used the injury requirements of
Article III of the Constitution to impose serious burdens on cross-border
environmental plaintiffs. Second, the Court held that while Congress can
by statute define what harms constitute injuries upon which standing can
be based, such efforts are limited by what the Court read as the substantial
limits of Article 111.92 While there is little question that Article III imposes
limits to Congress' treatment of standing, it is not clear that the Article III
requirements were intended to be read to impose such onerous burdens as
the Court espoused in Lujan. Thus, under Lujan, while Congress could
attempt to amend all the appropriate environmental statutes to provide for
cross-border citizens standing, there is at least the possibility that these
efforts would be judged at some future date to run afoul of Article III's
requirements.
Similarly, while Canadian law provides Canadian citizens with standing
to commence an action in cases where the right or duty to act falls
generally upon the Attorney General, this public interest standing provision does not speak to the rights of non-nationals to undertake similar
actions. 93 Thus, it is likely that an agreement requiring cross-border citizen
suit provisions would require a significant change in Canadian law.
Standing issues, however, do not necessarily prevent such a cross-border
scheme from playing a role in encouraging environmental law enforcement. In fact, under existing United States law, foreign parties have played
a substantive role in U.S. environmental law in a number of different
contexts, including in enforcement suits.94 Standing problems can, however, limit the effectiveness of such a cross-border scheme by substantially
narrowing the range of individuals who can raise environmental concerns.
4. Democratization, Repression, and Corruption
Despite Mexico's efforts at substantial political reform, serious concerns
remain over the state of democratic governance in Mexico. 95 Allegations of
corruption and repression continue to come from Mexican citizens against
92. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166, 230-233 (1992)
93. See Galob, supra note 77, at 99. Canadian law does provide non-nationals with access to its
courts in "actions in personam, in respect of contracts or torts though the cause of action may have
arisen abroad, and although the parties may be aliens, provided service of process can be affected
according to the Rules of Court .. " Baxter v. Jacobs, 1 B.C.R. (pt.lI) 370 (Q.B. 1889); see also
Galob, supra, at 141-42.
94. See John N. Hanson et al., The Application of the United States Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Laws in the Canada-U.S. Context, 18 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 137, 167-169 (1992) (discussing incidents
where Canadian parties have been granted standing to challenge U.S. environmental actions).
95. See Representative John Lafalce, Why I Oppose NAFTA, ROLL CALL, Mar. 29, 1993.
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their own government.9 6 While a cross-border citizen suit provision would
play a substantial role in democratizing Mexico's legal system, given the
fears of many Mexicans that those who challenge the government may
suffer reprisals, the extent to which such a system will serve as a vehicle for
Mexican citizens to play a role in their government must be questioned.
Regardless of the state of the environment around them, if an impoverished and politically disenfranchised Mexican citizen believes, with or
without reason, that she will be harmed if she complains about her government's poor enforcement of its laws, she is unlikely to jeopardize
her life
97
and her family by commencing an action against the government.
The benefit of the cross-border citizen suit approach is that, by allowing
suits by American and Canadian citizens and groups, who have more
experience in bringing such actions and are more removed from threats of
government repression, enforcement will not be frustrated by inexperience
or fear of repression. However, by relying on foreign individuals and
entities to enforce the laws of each NAFTA country, the cross-border
approach is open to charges, whether founded or not, of eco-imperialism.
Mexico fears that if such a cross-border scheme is adopted, Mexico's court
dockets will be immediately inundated with cases brought by American
companies and environmental groups seeking to tell Mexico what is wrong
with its system of environmental enforcement. This fear does not seem
entirely unjustified; if such a system is adopted, United States citizens and
companies comfortable with judicial fora are likely to use these newly
available avenues.
Regardless of whose citizens will use a cross-border scheme to commence enforcement actions, the overall effectiveness of the scheme will
depend in large measure on the fairness and impartiality of the judicial
forums relied upon. Here again serious concerns exist over corruption
within the Mexican judicial system that could undermine the effectiveness
of such a cross-border citizen suit scheme.
B.

THE TRADE MEASURES APPROACH

As discussed above, the Clinton Administration's negotiating draft for a
supplemental environmental agreement does utilize trade measures to

96. See generally Asa Cristina Laurell, Mexico, A Restricted Democracy, 5 CUADERNOS CASA DEL
SOL 1, 11-17 (discussing electoral fraud), 18-23 (discussing increases in violent repression) (1992).
Issues of democracy and human rights have also been raised by the international human rights
community. See Paul Basken, U.S. Group Criticizes Mexico on Human Rights, UPI, Sept. 7, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (discussing Americas Watch report on Mexico).
97. See, e.g., Andrew Reding, How to Put Due-Process Guarantees into NAFTA, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 20, 1993, at B7; Marjorie Miller, Killing Threats Cause Concern in Mexico, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1992, at A17.
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enforce domestic environmental law in certain circumstances. 98 The U.S.
enforcement proposal has been criticized by a number of environmental
groups, and by U.S. businesses, but for wholly different reasons. 99 Environmentalists are pleased that sanctions are proposed, but believe that both
the standard for enforcement and the process are flawed. Attempting to
sanction nonenforcement of any national environmental law may create a
disincentive to establish new or more stringent laws, while also breaking
the link between lax environmental enforcement and the industrial flight it
engenders.'
Additionally, environmentalists claim that the process is
problematic, due to the "persistent and unjustifiable pattern of nonenforcement" standard, the two-country vote needed to convene a panel,
the lack of a fixed time frame for resolution of conflicts, and the focus on
country rather than company misdeeds.1t ' The business community, on the
other hand, opposes any use of trade sanctions to enforce environmental
laws.1" 2 Instead, businesses favor the NACE being
used as a forum for
10 3
cooperation to enhance environmental protection.
An alternative means of encouraging NAFTA parties to enhance their
enforcement of environmental laws would be to provide for the use of
trade measures in cases where a country's failure to enforce its own laws is
a material cause of an injury which: a) is transboundary in nature; or b)
affects the global commons; or c) distorts trade flows.'0 4 While there are
several ways in which a scheme for applying environmentally-based trade
measures could be fashioned, the following format, focusing on the North
American Commission on the Environment now under negotiation, re98. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
99. See SIERRA CLUB ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL

AGREEMENT TO THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:

SIDE

OMISSIONS AND AMBIGUITIES

(June 8, 1993) (endorsed by 28 environmental groups) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Side
Agreement Analysis]; Letter from the Business Roundtable et al., to United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor (endorsed by 8 business coalitions) [hereinafter Business Critique] (on file
with authors).
100. See Side Agreement Analysis, supra note 99, at 4.
101. See id. Stewart Hudson of the National Wildlife Federation, an organization that is
perceived by many as an unabashed NAFTA supporter, has stated: "[T]he route to sanctions
under the Administration's plan is a tortuous one. Any reasonable analysis of the proposal ...
suggests [that] the probability of trade sanctions ever coming into play is almost nil." Stewart
Hudson, NAFTA's Environmental Struggle, J. CoMM., June 17, 1993, at 8.
102. Business Critique, supra note 99, at 6.
103. Id.
104. See Side Agreement Analysis, supra note 99, at 4. In order to ensure that a country does
not lower its standards to avoid NACE actions for its failure to enforce these standards, the levels
of protection in place in each country at the time of the supplemental agreement would be locked
in as floors. Even with this "lock in" a country should be able to lower or eliminate a standard
where the country can prove through scientific evidence that the threat the standard sought to
address no longer exists, or is addressed in an equally effective manner by some alternative
regulatory scheme. Deviations from locked in standards could themselves be challenged before the
NACE.
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flects what the authors believe is a consensus within a coalition of groups
in the environmental community.10 5
In order to understand how the NACE can play a role in enforcement
disputes, it is necessary to have a general understanding of the structure
for the NACE that has been proposed by the environmental community.
The NACE would have three essential components: 1) a commission made
up of one member from each NAFTA Party, either a senior, specially
appointed government official (similar in stature to a country's U.N. Ambassador), or the principal environmental agency head (in the United States,
the EPA Administrator would serve as NACE commissioner); 2) an independent secretariat staffed with persons from the NAFTA countries serving in their individual capacities; and 3) a public advisory commission
made up of experts in trade and environmental issues drawn from NGOs,
academia, business, and subfederal level governments within the NAFTA
countries.t°6
1. Who Can Bring a NACE Case, and the Screening of Cases
Under the coalition's NACE enforcement proposal, any legal citizen of
a NAFTA party (including any governmental unit, non-governmental organization, corporation or individual having some particularized stake in a
matter), would have the power to petition the NACE directly to begin an
investigation and dispute resolution process on environmental enforcement failures. In an effort to limit the use of the NACE as a protectionist
device, a number of alternative proposals have called for allowing only the
federal governments to be able to petition the NACE. These proposals
seek to use federal governments as a screen against frivolous and harassing
NACE cases. While the goal of avoiding such cases is a laudable one, the
costs of this filtration device exceed their value. NAFTA's provisions and
institutions are already markedly undemocratic. For example, trade disputes under NAFTA's chapter 20 are conducted in secrecy by national
governments; citizens have no voice in the proceedings and can be foreclosed from the right to have access to information and documents produced for and from these disputes. If the overall NAFTA package is to
have any ability to encourage wider recognition of the values of participatory democracy, then the NACE must serve as a counterweight to NAFTA's
highly undemocratic nature. Thus, the NACE must provide citizens with
105. See Letter of March 4, 1993, supra note 63, at 9-12. This approach builds on many of the
ideas of the various proposals set out above. Our thanks go to the individuals on whose work we
build.
106. See, e.g., Letter of March 4, 1993, supra note 63, at 9-12; HUDSON & PRUDENCIO, supra note
63. The U.S. negotiating draft adopted a similar structure. See U.S. Negotiating Text, supra note
21, art. 8.
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the ability to participate directly in its affairs.
A hybrid method that might prove more acceptable to some would be to
permit citizens the right to petition the NACE directly, but only after they
have requested that their domestic government file a NACE complaint
and that request has been denied. A requirement that the petitioner
suit provisions
exhaust all available remedies is common in the citizen
10 7
under U.S. domestic laws, and functions relatively well.
The NACE proposal put forth by the Center for International Environmental Law and Defenders of Wildlife attempts to address fears of protectionism while preserving the necessary democratic character of the NACE.
Under this proposal, any citizen or group could petition the NACE, but
the NACE would have the ability to screen and select the cases that should
go to a formal dispute process. Again, any case selected would have to fall
within at least one of the three categories for NACE review: a) transboundary effects; b) effects on the global commons; or c) distortive effects on
trade flows. Subject to this limitation, cases would be selected based on the
importance of the issues they raise. It might also be appropriate to provide
preference to cases brought by federal and subfederal governmental entities in the selection of cases to be heard. In envisioning the workings of a
NACE screening process, an analogy to the functioning of the United
States Supreme Court's process and criteria for the granting of certiorari is
helpful.10 8
Moreover, fears of potential protectionism are also addressed by this
proposal in that NACE complaints could not be commenced against
individual private citizens or entities, but instead only against the inadequacies of governmental efforts. Thus, only federal and subfederal governments could be NACE respondents for their failure to enforce their own
laws. By providing a governmental veil between the complaining party and
the environmental failure complained of, the threat of protectionist interests hijacking the process to harass their competitors is substantially diminished.

107. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, at § 1365(b)(1)(A),
(B) (except under certain circumstances, no citizen suit can be commenced for violations of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act: prior to sixty days notice to the enforcement authorities of
the violation; or if the enforcement authorities have commenced and are diligently pursuing an
enforcement action); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, at § 6972(c); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, at § 1540(g)(2); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300f-300j-26, at § 300j-8(b); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, at § 9659(d)(1), (2).
108. The Supreme Court uses a writ of certiorari as a discretionary device, to choose the cases it
wishes to hear. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Supreme Court's discretion is guided by the standards
set forth in the Court's own rules. See U.S.C.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 17 (1992).
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2. The Conduct of a NACE Case
The ultimate goal of a trade measures approach is to encourage each
NAFTA country to vigorously enforce its domestic environmental laws;
the goal is not the creation of a new private cause of action for members of
theitraditional trade bar to wield in advancing the pecuniary interests of
their corporate clients. That said, because corporations understand the
workings of their industry, they are, in may instances, best suited for
determining how environmental compliance can be effected in that industry; they should not be excluded from the enforcement process. Where a
country's lax enforcement of its environmental laws creates trade distortions, the goal of vigorous domestic enforcement is best served by removing the economic incentive for lax enforcement and by counteracting the
resultant competitive advantages. 10 9
To support this public policy directive, the proposed procedures for the
conduct of a NACE case are directed at encouraging the parties to end the
dispute by ensuring that entities within their borders come into compliance
with the laws in question. Once a case is brought and accepted by the
NACE commissioners, the parties to the dispute would be brought together under the auspices of the NACE for consultations aimed at alleviating the complained of environmental harm (i.e., requiring enforcement of
the law in question). An effective consultative process is a critical element
of encouraging compliance, since it will facilitate settlement and lessen the
need to use sanctions.
This consultation process should include at least two distinct components: 1) a political consultation process; and 2) a technological consultation process. The political consultation process in a NACE dispute would
resemble the consultation process that is undertaken in virtually all traditional trade disputes.1 1 ° The technological consultation process, however,
has no correlative in traditional trade disputes. Directed at achieving
compliance as the goal of NACE disputes, the technological consultative
process would make available expertise, technology and financing information necessary to facilitate a technological solution to the complained of
practice through the purchase and installation of appropriate pollution
control technologies. As these procedures reflect, the hope is that the vast
majority of NACE cases will be settled in the consultation stage, without
recourse to trade measures. However, the threat of potential trade sanctions is necessary to bring the parties to the table to consult in good faith

109. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2006 (setting out consultation process in trade
disputes).
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with an eye towards compliance."' 1
If the consultation process fails to successfully resolve the dispute, the
NACE itself will commence an investigation to verify the complaint and
issue a report as to its findings. This report would be a public document,
but procedures should be crafted to insulate national security, trade secrets, and/or business proprietary information. The matter would then be
referred to a dispute panel formed under the NACE's auspices. Panel
members would be selected from a standing roster of individuals with
significant trade and environmental expertise. The selection process for
panel members might, for example, function like the panel selection process set up for traditional trade disputes under NAFTA chapter 20.112
The parties to the dispute, and any other interested party, private or
public, would then submit written briefs to the panel outlining their cases.
These briefs would generally be publicly available, though exceptions
should be crafted to protect information that falls within the realms of
national security, trade secrets, or business proprietary information. After
examination of the NACE report and the briefs, the Panel would hold
public hearings, at which time the parties to the dispute would make oral
arguments, and the panel could ask questions of the parties. In addition,
the procedures for the NACE, like those of the United States Supreme
where the
Court, should allow amici curiae to present oral arguments
1 13
heard.
be
to
them
allow
to
agree
panel
the
and
parties
Assuming that the parties still cannot come to a mutually acceptable
agreement to alleviate a dispute, the panel would then deliberate and
come to a decision on the matter. This decision would be presented in
written form and would also be made immediately available to the public.
After the panel has reached a conclusion, a second consultation would
begin. The makeup of this second consultation would be similar to that of
the first consultation in that it would have both a political and a technological component. However, the parties would have the benefit of the panel's
report during this second consultation. The time frame for second consultations should be specified in the NACE's procedures, and there should be
the option of a one time extension if both the parties agree that they are

111. See Letter from Donald L. Connors, Chairman, Environmental Business Council, and
Rodger Schlickeisen, President, Defenders of Wildlife, to Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United
States Trade Representative, Apr. 8, 1993; see also Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for
Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the StrategiesDesign of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J.
301 (1990) (discussing the effectiveness of the retaliatory measures available under Section 301 of
U.S. trade law in bringing about settlements in trade disputes); Robert F. Housman, A Kantian
Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1385-1386 (1992)
(discussing the need for both trade "carrots and sticks" to encourage environmental reforms).
112. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2009-2011.
113. U.S.C.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 37 (1992).
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close to forging a settlement and additional consultations would facilitate
that result.
In cases where the NACE has verified the complaint, the panel has
issued a report in favor of the complaining party (i.e., the failure of a party
to enforce its environmental laws has resulted in a transboundary harm, a
harm to the global commons, or a distortion to trade flows), and the
second consultation does not result in a mutually acceptable end to the
matter, the NACE would certify these findings and authorize the appropriate domestic trade agency or agencies to determine whether trade sanctions are warranted. The national governments would retain the ultimate
discretion to determine whether or not to take a trade measure, but they
would be required to make a public, detailed determination in a timely
fashion and certify that determination to the NACE.
3. Sanctions
A supplemental agreement could provide one or more types of sanctions
in cases where the domestic agency determines, after authorization from
the NACE, that trade sanctions are an appropriate response to the failure
of another party to enforce its environmental laws. For example, the
Center for International Environmental Law and the Defenders of Wildlife have suggested that in cases linked to the failure to enforce laws
against a particular company or industry, the appropriate sanction would
be a tariff snapback -that would remove the tariff reduction benefits of
NAFTA for the appropriate industrial sector.' 14 Because tariffs on many
goods are already, even without NAFTA, relatively low and may not serve
as effective sanctions, 1 5 the country taking the measure should be allowed
to elect to take a tariff snapback to the higher of either the tariff in place
or the average of all domestic tariffs in place prior to
before NAFTA
116
NAFTA.
114. NAFTA chapter 8 already permits the use of tariff snapbacks for purposes of combatting
import surges. See NAFTA, supra note 1, chap. 8. The NACE should also have authority to impose
fines as a catchall sanction in cases of transboundary and global commons harms that do not also
inflict trade injuries.
115. Prior to implementation of NAFTA, U.S. tariffs on goods from Mexico average only 4%.
See REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND
ACTIONS TAKEN IN FULFILLMENT OF THE MAY 1, 1991 COMMITMENTS 20 (Sept. 18, 1992) (Mexico's
tariffs average 10%, which is two and a half times the U.S. average).
116. For example, assume the NACE determines that the U.S. may sanction the Mexican widget
industry because its factories have not installed mandatory pollution control equipment, and
therefore Mexican widgets can be sold in the U.S. at a price that undercuts U.S. manufacturers'
prices. Tariffs on Mexican widgets were set at 2% before NAFTA, and were immediately phased
out on the effective date of the accord. A tariff snapback would result in only a 2% duty on
Mexican widgets, that being the rate prior to NAFTA's implementation. This rate may provide
little incentive for the Mexican authorities or the Mexican widget industry to install the required
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While it is highly draconian to sanction an entire industrial sector for
the failure of a government to require a single company to comply with
environmental laws, the severity of this sanction serves to encourage the
country to enforce the laws against the single company, avoiding the trade
sanctions all together. An acceptable alternative would be to authorize
sanctions only against the offending company or companies. Any sanction
taken could remain in place only so long as the other party continues to
fail to enforce the law in question.
4. Sovereignty Concerns
While all of the NAFTA countries have expressed reservations about a
supranational NACE armed with "guns and badges" and the powers to
enter their territories, subpoena corporate or governmental records, or
close factories that do not comply with certain standards, such an intrusive
NACE is a far cry from the one proposed by the environmental community. The standards the NACE would seek to enforce would be the
domestic, democratically constructed environmental, health, safety, and
conservation laws of each respective party. If a NAFTA country does not
wish to enforce its own democratically enacted laws, it seems appropriate
to question first why those laws exist, and second whether such a country is
an appropriate partner for a free trade agreement.
Moreover, the application of a trade measure against a country would
not require a country to change its domestic enforcement practices. Rather,
it would merely require the country to pay compensation for any lack of
enforcement that denies its trading partners competitive benefits promised
by NAFTA in the first instance. NAFTA is rife with examples of sovereignty waivers, especially in the areas of IPR, antitrust and trade regulation. Throughout the agreement, Mexico has effectively agreed to establish
wholly new domestic regimes with mechanisms for the United States and
Canada to enforce these provisions if necessary. Enforcement of environmental regulations should pose no more of a sovereignty threat than the
other enforcement mechanisms already agreed to in NAFTA. If sovereignty concerns attendant to environmental enforcement are problematic,
then the question must be asked, why is it acceptable for a NAFTA trade
panel to serve as judge and jury over a party's domestic environmental,
health and safety standards?" 7

pollution control equipment. If, however, the tariff could be raised to 4%, the average of all U.S.
tariffs pre-NAFTA, the Mexican authorities might find it to be more in their country's economic
interest to install the equipment rather than pay the tariffs.
117. Chapter 7B and Chapter 9 of NAFTA address sanitary and phytosanitary measures and
standards-related measures, respectively. These provisions could conceivably address everything
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Further, sovereignty concerns regarding the creation of a supranational
enforcement body are misplaced, because the NACE would not have the
authority under this proposal even to implement trade sanctions. It would
merely have the ability to authorize a party itself to commence a trade
measure. Thus, in terms of actual powers, the NACE would have no
supranational ability to independently conduct enforcement actions.
The effect of NACE actions on prosecutorial discretion is the area that
gives rise to perhaps the highest degree of sovereignty apprehension.
Critics of a strong NACE argue that such a NACE will diminish the ability
of government authorities to determine what laws are to be enforced and
how these laws are to be enforced. These concerns are not without merit.
For example, government authorities in the United States often use the
threat of enforcement activities to cause companies to take measures that
may not immediately bring a facility into compliance, but are nonetheless
directed towards that goal, and may have other beneficial social consequences that outweigh the harm caused by the lag time before full compliance is achieved. For example, a factory discharging a toxic substance can
be excused from short term discharges in excess of statutory limits if the
factory is putting in a closed loop system to end discharges altogether.
While this concern is a valid one, it need not be grounds for abandoning
the idea of NACE authorized trade sanctions. Instead, what is necessary is
a set of negotiated criteria that can be used to differentiate between
prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial abuse. Such a set of criteria
would properly look at, inter alia: 1) whether the statute provides a mechanism for agency discretion; 2) the rationale behind the decision not to
enforce in light of the goals the statute in question seeks to achieve; 3)
whether the decision not to enforce is tied to a larger, environmentally
beneficial plan of action; 4) whether the decision not to enforce was
motivated by solely economic concerns; 5) whether the act of using discretion directly conflicts with the statute; and 6) whether the statute or the
enforcement decision envisions some form of test or pilot program that
places higher standards on the facilities involved. If a domestic enforcement agency's action were a permissible exercise of discretion, then absent
more compelling evidence of subterfuge, the act of exercising such enforcement discretion would not constitute an actionable incident of lax enforcement.

from carcinogens in foods to the design of child safety seats for automobiles. If regulations
governing such matters were to be challenged as trade barriers, the dispute would be heard under
the provisions of the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement procedure. See NAFTA, supra note 1,
chaps. 7B, 9, 20.
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5. Subfederal Entities and NACE Actions
Because many North American environmental protections exist at the
subfederal (state and local) level, and because federal environmental
protection programs are often delegated to subfederal entities to implement and enforce,' t subfederal level enforcement patterns must be within
NACE's oversight. While the applicability of NACE oversight to subfederal entities may raise concerns among such entities, several factors should
serve to minimize these concerns. First and foremost, unlike in NAFTA
disputes, if a state enforcement action was challenged in NACE, the state
would have every right to defend its actions in NACE's open forum.
Second, given the focus of the NACE and the necessary guidelines for
prosecutorial discretion, states that are environmental leaders are unlikely
to find their environmental enforcement actions called into question.
Thus, if California's air standards are far and away more stringent than
those in Canada and Mexico, as well as the rest of the United States,
assuming good faith actions by California to implement these standards, it
would be difficult for any party to challenge California's implementation of
these standards." 9 Further, subfederal implementation of enforcement
actions could potentially be shielded from review where the standard is
strictly a state standard unrelated to any federal standard or program.
Finally, like all democratically elected political entities, subfederal governments have a responsibility to enforce their laws, so to the extent NACE
only encourages them to do so, concern over NACE's effect on their
actions is diminished.
VI. CONCLUSION: FORGING A SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENT

Given the inherent strengths and weaknesses in both the citizen suit/
IPR model and the trade measures model of NAFTA-related environmental enforcement, the best approach probably is to combine these two
methods to encourage and ensure full enforcement of each country's own
domestic laws. A NAFTA supplemental environmental agreement should
require each country to accord its citizens the right to fair judicial and
administrative procedures for challenging their own government's failure
to enforce environmental laws. In addition, the supplemental agreement
should provide the NACE with the ability to convene panels to hear
118. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, at § 1313(c)(2)(B).
119. Even absent enforcement, most U.S. facilities meet environmental standards well above
those imposed on the industries of other trading partners. Thus, it would be difficult for a
challenging party to assert that a competitive disadvantage existed just because a U.S. facility
didn't meet all local standards.
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environmental disputes and to recommend to the national governments,
where appropriate, the right to take trade measures to address another
NAFTA party's failure to enforce its environmental laws.
This combined approach has several critical advantages. The right of
citizens to take legal actions against their own governments provides a
wedge behind which greater democratic reforms can be driven. (However,
by requiring only the domestic provision of citizen standing, this approach
avoids the need for the sweeping constitutional reforms that may be
necessary to provide cross-border standing to "NAFTA nationals" under
all environmental laws.) Combining these benefits with the international
ability of NAFTA citizens to seek recourse in the NACE diminishes the
concern that the citizens may be prevented by government repression from
voicing their concerns, thereby frustrating efforts to create an enforcement
climate based on democracy. Moreover, the provision of an international
mechanism to authorize trade sanctions for certain failures of environmental enforcement provides a substantial incentive for each country to enforce its laws, without treading too heavily upon national sovereignty.
Establishing a mechanism to ensure that environmental enforcement
takes place alongside NAFTA trade liberalization will also send an important message to the rest of the world trading community, in particular the
GATT negotiators. This message comes in three parts. First, enforcement
of effective environmental laws plays a vital role in securing a level playing
field upon which free and fair trade can take place. Second, through
environmental cost internalization, trade agreements can become mechanisms for more sustainable economic development. Finally, through creative thinking, hard work and a commitment to the betterment of both
human and environmental conditions, the integration of trade and environmental concerns need not wait.

